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THE GERMAN WAY TOWARDS DISCLOSURE
HELMUT KOHL * and RAINER WALZ *
Any attempt to assess the advantages and disadvantages of disclosure require-
ments to the individual investor and the capital market as a whole in Germany can-
not be anything but superficial. Empirically-based economic cost benefit analyses
comparable to those by Benston, Stigler, et al. 1 do not exist in Germany. There-
fore, the discussion necessarily must be speculative, and cannot weigh facts and evi-
dence. Secondly, rights to information and disclosure requirements in Germany
traditionally have been based on a philosophy different from that in the U.S. - the
"investor", Le., a person who transfers a certain amount of capital to other people
or companies in hopes of a good return - was never the center of attention. Rather,
these rules were established in the interests of the creditor and the "co-owner", a
person who needs all relevant information in order to exercise his membership
rights in the company intelligently. Furthermore, the concept of allocational effi-
ciency was basically foreign to German legal thinking. It has just recently - due to
U.S. influences - been introduced into the discussion in Germany and has not, as
yet, had any influence on legislation.
Consequently, it is impossible to give a detailed economic analysis like Mendel-
son's, 2 but it might be of interest to a non-German audience to discuss the reasons
why empirical economic analyses, comparable to those that were conducted in the
U.S., do not exist in Germany (section 1), to describe the system and the instru-
ments of disclosure (section 2), to outline the arguments for and against disclosure
within their historical contexts (section 3), and to attempt an explanation of why
legal provisions and legal reasoning concerning disclosure in Germany differ so
much from those developed in the U.S. (section 4).
1. Why economists are disinterested
No German economist would ever seriously try to assess the importance of dis-
closure for the investor as far as new issues of stock are concerned. There simply is
no need for empirical studies of the subject because new issues of shares almost
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never occur within the organized capital market. The number of shares of Gernlan
companies listed on the German stock exchanges or admitted to the free market
(Freiverkehr), which is in fact regulated, has been steadily declining during the past
few years. 3 New companies trying to raise capital in the stock market are virtually
nonexistent. Admittedly, there have been a few "new" names listed on the Frank-
furt, Dusseldorf, and Hamburg exchanges, but virtually none of these companies
were German. Most were British, U.S., Japanese, or Dutch "blue chips", already
governed by the as (or even more) strict disclosure requirements of their own juris-
dictions.
If, as the majority of authorities insist, disclosure should be beneficial for the
individual German investor, then he would be well served by the disclosure regula-
tions of these other countries. British, U.S., Japanese, and Dutch law would give
him - or rather his investment advisor (in Germany usually a bank) - all necessary
information to evaluate the recent performance and future prospects of ICI, Philips,
Ford, Shell, Mitsubishi or IBM. Even if it were true, as Stigler et al. claim, that
information is useless to the investor, there still would not be any valid reason for
serious concern. The additional costs of disclosure incurred through the introduc-
tion of a foreign issue into the German capital market would be negligible for com-
panies of this size and for those persons who decided to invest their capital in those
enterprises. Serious cost arguments could hardly be raised.
But even without detailed empirical evidence, it can be argued that outside of
the stock market, publicity requirements have had very beneficial effects for the
investor, at least in a very limited area, where in the words of Brandeis, "sunlight"
has proved to be "the best disinfectant". 4 For quite a number of years, several
investment companies based outside Germany - the most prominent being Inves-
tors Overseas Service (IOS) - succeeded in reaping substantial amounts of capital
from private investors in Germany. They issued glossy advertisements and pam-
phlets, promised enormous returns and employed an armada of well-trained door-
to-door salesmen who were able to attract the interest and money of doctors,
dentists, and lawyers. The collapse of JOS eventually prompted the German federal
legislature to pass the Foreign Investment Act (Auslandsinvestmentgesetz). This Act
makes the offering and sale of shares in investment companies based outside
Germany illegal unless a prospectus, fulfilling certain minimum requirements, has
been submitted to the German federal agency supervising the activities of banks
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen/Berlin). Even though this agency does not
have the duty or obligation to check the validity of the data set forth in the pros-
pectus, the threat of civil and criminal liability for misleading statements apparently
proved to be strong enough to induce the vast majority of the more than 20 invest-
ment companies based outside Germany that were selling shares in that country to
discontinue business there. Fraudulent or obviously unsound investment activities
were weeded out. One might even venture to say that this legislative effort im-
proved allocational efficiency in the German capital market. No more money was
wasted in phony companies based outside Germany, whose major objective con-
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sisted in making just one person rich in a short time - the sponsor. 5
Turning to the benefits of disclosure for the investor as far as outstanding issues
of stock are concerned, we again have to report that no empirical research has been
conducted in Germany. 6 And here it is impossible to claim that such research
would be superfluous - shares of outstanding issues are bought and sold by inves-
tors in Germany. Nevertheless, this lack of evidence seems to be much less impor-
tant than in the U.S. Even if some economists should discover that the individual
investor and possibly the capital market would not gain substantially from disclo-
sure requirements, or that increased disclosure would even have detrimental effects,
this would still be of little concern in Germany. German disclosure regulation, as we
have noted, has not been based on market efficiency arguments.
2. The German legal framework
A. General remarks
The difference in attitudes between U.S. and German lawyers towards disclosure
is no mere reflection of differences of national business mentality. If rash conclu-
sions or severe misunderstandings are to be avoided, one must bear in mind that the
arguments for and against disclosure are put forward to defend or to criticize an
existing legal status quo which is itself part of a specific legal system. An idea may
prove extremely convincing in one legal frame of reference, while providing few
answers to problems generated by a different legal setting. Thus, a short summary
of the German legal background concerning disclosure regulation seems indis-
pensable.
One of the most influential arguments used against the extension of actual dis-
closure requirements in Germany is that they would be contrary to the basic struc-
ture of the law governing business organization and commercial associations. 7
Because of tax considerations and specific traditions of doing business, the joint
stock company (Aktiengesellschaft) is not the natural form for many larger-sized
enterprises. A business of the type carried on by a typical U.S. closed corporation
would usually not be incorporated in Germany. The law offers the businessman a
wide variety of organizational types from which he can choose according to his
situation and the various advantages the forms offer with respect to risk propensity,
independence, capital needs, familial considerations, etc. There is a general feeling
that this freedom of choice has worked well, and that it should not be distorted by
imposing disclosure where up to now none has been needed.
The birth of the modern body of law regulating business associations and com-
panies coincided with the industrial revolution in Germany and the entrepreneurial
spirit that accompanied it. The emerging legal forms had to be molded in such a
way as to coordinate the different interests on which industrial progress relied. 8
These interests were those of innovative entrepreneurs, who by themselves were not
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abole financially to set up an independent business, and of investors, who supplied
their money but stayed to a greater or lesser extent outside the management. Their
diminishing direct involvement with management had to be complemented by
mechanisms allowing for influence or at least control from the outside. Another
group whose interests had to be provided for were the creditors, e.g., banks or sup-
pliers of goods. Their common interest was directed towards dealing with some-
body who would be able to pay his debts.
The different interests mentioned, though contradictory in many respects, had a
common goal: the financial success of the enterprise. 9 Also, as it was thought that
in a free-market society, this common aim could be realized as long as everybody
was given the greatest possible freedom of action, the law did not impose a certain
form of enterprise but rather proposed different types: the open commercial
partnership (offene Handelsgesellsehaft = OHG), the limited partnership (Kom-
manditgesellschaft = KG), the dormant partnership (stille Gesellschaft = stG), the
private limited company (Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung = GmbH), and the
joint stock company (Aktiengesellschaft = AG), to name only the most important.
Not only are there different types, but businessmen are even free to modify and
mix different forms to suit their convenience. A famous example is the now well-
established GmbH and Co., KG, a limited partnership whose managing and person-
ally liable partner is a private limited company. 1o The main exception to the
hands-off policy of the law was the regulation of the joint stock company, where
the main body of rules consists"of strict law not modifiable at will. But given the
specific structure of the German capital market, the economic need to choose this
strictly-regulated form was not as strong as elsewhere. This is shown by Table I. 11
B. Disclosure by ently in the Commercial Register and publication in the Federal
Gazette
German commercial law provides two basic instruments through which internal
business information is disseminated to the public. First there is disclosure by entry
Table 1
Legal forms of the 1000 biggest enterprises in Germany in the years 1954 and 1960.
Forms of enterprises 1954 1960
Joint stock companies 497 435
Limited private companies 278 299
Limited partnerships 122 159
Open commercial partnerships 30 36
Single businesses 34 38
Others 39 33
Total 1000 1000
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in the Commercial Register (Handelsregister). The function of this Register is to
convey to the public the names of the local members of the business community to
whom commercial law, in most continental countries a specific body of rules, is
applicable. The Register also contains information about personal liability and
liability limits and the names of the persons with authority to act for the business.
The Register is administered by county courts (Amtsgerichte). Although the
magistrate may in case of doubt engage in proceedings to check on the adequacy of
an entry petition, he will normally only see to it that the formal requirements are
fulfilled. The term "Commercial Register" has also come to signify the department
of the court to which the businessman must submit a variety of documents, which
then become part of register publicity although they are not formally entered in the
register book.
The Commercial Register is available to anyone who wants to inspect it. Whether
pertinent information has been registered or not has legal consequences for con-
tractual or quasi-contractual liability towards third parties.
The second main instrument of disclosure is an announcement in the official
nationwide "Bundesanzeiger" (Federal Gazette) and in other publications which
the contract of association or the company charter may designate.
The individualfirm must submit the following items for entry in the Commercial
Register: 12 the name and the domicile of the business; the name and residence of
the proprietor; changes of the firm's and the proprietor's name, and any changes of'
domicile or residence; the termination of the firm; and the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings. With the exception of the last item, all these entries must be published
in the Federal Gazette, 13 if that form of disclosure is used.
The open commercial partnership must register the same items as the individual
businessman; all partners have to be listed. Additionally, the following information
must be given: 14 the date of the beginning of actual business activity; changes of
partners; contractual deviations from the rule that each partner has full authority to
act for the partnership as a whole; the institution of liquidation proceedings; the
continuation of a dissolved partnership in accordance with special provisions of
commercial law; in case of liquidation, the name and residence of the liquidators;
and the termination of the partnership. The requirements for publication in the
Federal Gazette are similar to those for the individual business proprietor. The con-
tract of association, the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement are not dis-
closed.
The disclosure requirements for the limited partnership are quite similar to those
of the open commercial partnership, with the exception of some specifics concern-
ing the limited partners. 1s Their names, the amount of their contributions and the
limitation of their liability must be entered in the Register, as well as any subse-
quent changes. The publication in the Federal Gazette and other designated publi-
cation organs need not name the limited partners individually, but only state the
number of partners.
The dormant partnership 16 is neither registered nor published as such. This
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institution - which is something in between a loan to a commercial enterprise and a
limited partnership - is treated, for registration purposes, as an individual firm of
the main partner.
The registration and publication requirements imposed by law have been greatly
extended for the private limited company. Only the most important will be given
here. The following items must be entered in the Commercial Register: 17 the name
and the domicile of the company; the nature of the business; the amount of capital;
the date of the constitution; the name and the residence of the managers, any sub-
sequent changes therein, and the cancellation of authority to act for the company;
changes in the constitution, especially alterations of the company's nominal capital
basis as stated in the constitution; and the termination of the company, the name
and residence of the liquidators, and their individual authority, if any, to act for the
company in liquidation.
In addition, the private limited companies must provide a series of documents
which, though not entered in the Commercial Register, become part of the Register
files and are thus available to interested persons, principally, of course, present or
prospective creditors. As part of the application for registration, the company must
submit: 18 the constitution with the minimum content as prescribed by statute,
such as the names of the members, object of the business, capital amount, the mem-
bers' contributions, additional obligations of members, if any (e.g., rendering of
services or assignment of a patent) and preferences granted to company founders;
the names of the managers, if not listed in the constitution; and a list of company
members, including their individual contributions to company capital.
Later, the following information must be submitted: 19 the names and resi-
dences of the members of the supervisory council; an annual list of company mem-
bers; changes in the constitution; changes of managers; and whenever an increase of
capital occurs, a list of the persons who subscribed to the increase.
The publication in the Federal Gazette must contain the information entered in.
the Commercial Register and in addition 2 0 must list any contributions other than
cash payments and the names of the contributors. The private limited company, if
not engaged in banking, 21 has no obligation to disclose its balance sheet and
profit and loss statement.
The joint stock company must fulfill similar legal requirements, though these
are, again, vastly expanded. The magistrate of the Commercial Register sees that the
formal requirements of company formation are fulfilled. Other items are necessary
because the company capital is divided into readily negotiable shares rather than
into non-marketable shares as in the case of the limited private company. Thus, in
addition to submitting all measures taken to acquire capital, the managing board
must record in the Commercial Register the extent to which preemptive shares were
issued during the preceding fiscal year.
The most important requirement, though, is that the joint stock company must
disclose its annual accounts and annual business report. The latter must give an
account of the progress of the company's business and its financial position. Any
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event of particular business significance within and after the close of the fiscal year
must be reported. The report also must comment on the annual financial statement.
The annual accounts of a company comprise its balance sheet and profit and loss
account. The statute defines the detailed forms of the balance sheet and the profit
and loss account 22 which the companies, as a rule, must use unless special rules and
forms apply as in the case of banks, insurance companies and a few other types of
business institutions. The annual accounts and the report are prepared each year
by the board of management. They are then audited by qualified professionals 23
and subsequently examined by the supervisory board. Then a shareholders meeting
is held, at which it is decided how to dispose of the retained earnings. 24 After the
shareholders meeting, the managing board must promptly file with the Commerical
Register the annual financial statement, accompanied by the auditors' certification,
and the annual business report together with a report of the supervisory board on
the results of the audit. 25 The certification accompanying the annual financial
statement must be signed by the auditors. If the auditors have refused to certify
the annual financial statement, that fact must be explicitly noted on the filed
financial statement. Also, the managing board must promptly publish the annual
financial statement in the publication organs designated in the company's con-
stitution, and file the publication with the Commercial Register, where it becomes
available for public inspection.
A major reform, brought about by the 1965 German Statute on Joint Stock
Companies, is the regulation of associated enterprises and groups of companies. 26
The main reason for the attempt to furnish legal structures for this modern business
phenomenon has been a strong feeling that group ties disturb the play of forces
normally expected between the managements of the companies concerned. The law
does not try to forbid a controlling company to impose its will on a subsidiary;
what it does is to provide guarantees which, it is hoped, will protect minority share-
holders and creditors of the subsidiary companies against losses. This legal aim has
also led to consequences for the registration and publication requirements here
under review.
Thus, the company's managing board must file certain legally specified enter-
prise and control agreements with the Commercial Register 27 as well as the name
of the other contracting party. The application must be accompanied by the agree-
ment and certify that the necessary approval of the shareholders has been ob-
tained. 28 The agreement is not valid until it is entered in the Commercial Register.
Subsequent modifications and the termination of the agreement 29 must also be
registered.
Furthermore, German law imposes a duty on a parent joint stock company to
submit group accounts, irrespective of the subsidiary's legal form. 30 An introduc-
tory law to the statute governing joint stock companies extends this duty to private
limited companies having one or more joint stock companies as subsidiaries, 31
although, as we have seen, private limited companies are not normally under such
an obligation.
Parent and subsidiary are treated as a single economic unit in group accounts;
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debts and liabilities between them cancel each other out. The individual accounts of
the enterprises concerned and the group accounts must be given as of the same
date, Le., the respective financial periods must coincide. Like tile individual finan-
cial statements, the group accounts consist of a consolidated balance sheet, a con-
solidated profit and loss account, and a consolidated annual business report. The
consolidated financial statements must be audited, published and entered in the
Commercial Register in the same way as the annual accounts of an individual joint
stock company. 32
For the first time in German legal history, the much-debated 33 Law Governing
Financial Statements and Reports of Certain Enterprises and Affiliated Groups of
1969 (Publizititsgesetz) 34 sets forth professional auditing, publication and regis-
tration requirements analogous to those prescribed for joint stock companies, irre-
spective of the legal form of the business. The legal point of reference is size, not
form; this has been considered revolutionary by most of the German business com-
munity.
The new law makes financial statements and reports obligatory if on the day of
the expiration of a fiscal year (closing day) and for the two preceding fiscal years,
an enterprise at any time has satisfied two of the following three conditions: (1) the
total assets for one of the annual balance sheets, as of the close of the fiscal year,
exceeds 125 million Deutsche Marks; (2) the gross income from the sale of goods
and services of the enterprise in the twelve months preceding the closing day
exceeds 250 million Deutsche Marks; (3) in the twelve months preceding the closing
day, the enterprise has employed on the average more than 5,000 workers. 35
The same law inposes a duty 36 to publish and deliver group accounts to the
Commercial Register if the parent enterprise has its head office in Germany and if
at the end of a fiscal year and the two preceding fiscal years two of the above-
mentioned conditions are satisfied by the group as a whole.
C. Capital market oriented disclosure
The disclosure regulation reviewed up to now has an essentially commercial law
background tailored to suit the typical interests of creditors, equity holders, and
management. The equity holders enter into the picture as owners or members of a
company entitled to various degrees of influence and control. To use these rights
properly, information about the actions of the management is necessary.
The interests of the potential investors in the capital market have traditionally
been taken care of by a different body of law centered around stock exchange
regulation. 37 Its origin dates back to the end of the 19th century. The vast indus-
trial growth of German industry before and after the unification of Germany in
1871 had led to the foundation of a great number of companies. The capital needed
was often raised by publishing eye-catching advertisements in the press, conveying
inadequate and faulty information about the issuer's business potential. In some
cases, investors were lured into placing their money in enterprises on the verge of
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bankruptcy, with consequences that are easily imagined. In 1892, a Stock Exchange
Investigating Committee (B6rsen-Enquete-Kommission) was appointed by the
Chancellor of the German Empire to investigate the factual and legal problems of
stock exchanges, and to establish the basis for legal regulation. The Stock Exchange
Act (B6rsengesetz) became effective in 1897. The law was last amended in 1975.38
The admission of securities to the stock exchange is regulated in Section III of
the Stock Exchange Act. It is complemented by a Notification Concerning the
Admission of Securities for Official Quotation (Bekanntmachung betreffend die
Zulassung von Wertpapieren zum B6rsenhandel) which was adopted in 1910. A
revision of this old regulation has been planned for years, but has not been imple-
mented because the E.E.C. Commission in Brussels is working to the same end and
trying to harmonize registration requirements in Europe. The Commission has
recently issued (January 1976) a proposal that has still to be dealt with by the
Council of Ministers.
The Stock Exchange Act requires the publication of a prospectus containing the
information necessary to evaluate the securities to be listed. The prospectus must
be issued prior to the first listing of the securities on the stock exchange. The same
applies to conversions of securities as well as to increases of capital. 39 The prospec-
tus is not published by the issuing company, 40 but by a public credit institution,
private bank or bank company, which thus puts its own business reputation at
stake. 41 The prospectus must be printed in at least one domestic newspaper deter-
mined by the stock exchange's board of admission. A notice concerning the publi-
cation must be printed in the Federal Gazette containing the name, the publicatior
date and the issue number of the newspaper. 42
The main items the prospectus must contain are: 43 the history of the company;
the business purposes of the company; development, nominal value and classifica-
tion of capital stock and special rights vested in securities already issued; outside
participations of over 25% and 50% and references to intercompany agreements
(particularly as to controlling interests and transfer of profits); composition of the
managing board and the supervisory council; provisions of the company's constitu-
tion regarding voting powers; appropriation of profits in accordance with the provi-
sions of the company's constitution; data on dividends paid within the last five
years; the last annual financial statements of the issuer, or where applicable, the
consolidated financial statements; explanations of all major items on the balance
sheet and any liabilities not shown on the balance sheet; description of business
operations; gross proceeds from sales over the last three years and production and
sales data; and present course of business and anticipated trend for the future. For
the listing of bonds, there are additional requirements which we will not specify
here.
A foreign business company applying for listing on a German stock exchange
must commit itself for a period of five years to publish an annual financial report
containing a profit and loss statement in a German newspaper designated by the
exchange's board of admission. 44
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With the exception of the five-year requirement as to publication of financial
statements of foreign companies, the disclosure requirements of the Stock
Exchange Act concern new issues. In a period of economic growth and company
expansion, this can be almost equivalent to a current disclosure requirement,
because every capital increase or new bond issue brings about a new prospectus
obligation. But this dissemination of information is only haphazard, and for a long
time it has not been considered sufficient.
In May 1968, the Federal Minister of Economics called together a committee of
independent experts to discuss this and other matters under the general heading of
improving stock exchange trading. 45 This committee recommended that all com-
panies listed on the exchange should submit regular, preferably quarterly, reports
about the situation of the enterprise and its prospects for the future so that the
average investor would have the gist of the actual business picture. To avoid more
stringent legislation, the exchanges and the banks have adopted this policy and are
successfully trying to have these interim reports issued by the companies con-
cerned. Companies representing about 90% of the stock listed on German
exchanges now submit these interim reports, which are unaudited, to the exchanges,
where they are reviewed to see that they contain at least the minimum information
desired.
Tougher proposals are being discussed. 46 Although they are not yet laws, they
tend to indicate the trend of future developments. These proposals would include
in the current disclosure reports information about turn-over, unfilled orders,
profits calculated on a half year basis, estimation of corporation income tax, rela-
tionships (affiliation or mergers) with other enterprises, or changes in the financial
situation of the company or in its market share. For affiliated enterprises and
groups of companies having to prepare consolidated financial statements, specific
requirements for the interim reports have been envisaged. All this will again be
publicly debated when the current E.E.C. harmonization attempts reach the state
of legislative enactment.
Another field of capital market disclosure, which was influenced by the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933, concerns the regulation of non-German investment com-
panies and the amendment of the law on German investment companies. 47 The law
does not shut the door to foreign investment companies, nor does it provide for an
examination of the quality of their shares. However, a foreign investment company
which intends to distribute its shares in Germany must notify the Federal Super-
visory Agency for Banking (Bundesaufsichtsamt flir das Kreditwesen). The com-
pany's activities can be prohibited if the Agency, in the course of its review, dis-
covers that statutory or administrative rules have been violated.
Great emphasis has been placed in this regulation on disclosure requirements. If
statements in a sales prospectus, which must contain all information of material im-
portance for evaluating the foreign investment company shares, are incorrect or
incomplete, the person who purchases them on the basis of the prospectus may
return them and have his money refunded. 48 As to current disclosure, 49 the
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foreign investment company must, inter alia, publish periodically in the Federal
Gazette a report of its earnings and expenditures; a list of the securities and stock
options belonging to the fund, their nominal and their market value, and changes in
comparision with the last report, and the difference between the number of shares
issued and the number redeemed during the accounting period. Furthermore, the
foreign investment company must make the issue and redemption prices for its
shares available to the public by publishing them at least once a week in the Federal
Gazette and daily in a newspaper with sufficient circulation.
At the same time that the law concerning foreign investment companies went
into effect, the law on German investment companies was amended to make a sales
prospectus mandatory and to provide for liability in case of false information in
roughly the same way as outlined above for foreign investment companies.
Recently, as a reaction to deceptive promotions of tax shelter investments, there
has been discussion of whether initial disclosure by an informative prospectus in all
cases of public offers of specified types should be required. In this discussion, it was
argued that the prospectus should be certified by a qualified auditor and should be
submitted to a supervising governmental agency with powers to prohibit offers,
sales and distribution if the prospectus does not comply with legal requirements. 50
The Federal Ministers of Finance and Justice are already preparing a legal draft
along these lines, and the reaction of the German law community has, on the
whole, been positive.
3. Policy considerations underlying the disclosure requirements 51
Ever since the Joint Stock Company Act of 1870 introduced the first disclosure
rules for that type of corporation, it was their prime and obvious purpose to force
the management to give a full account to the shareholders. Yet even then, the legis-
lature expressly articulated that a second party was entitled to receive information:
the "public". Since this Act abolished the old charter system - until then a joint
stock company needed a charter granted by the administration at its discretion and
was subject to close supervision by the state - it was generally agreed that new pro-
visions were required to insure sound business practices and to protect the public
egainst fraud and deceit. 52 One of the new provisions was the introduction of a
rule requiring the publication of the balance sheet in specific newspapers.
The importance of the interests of the public in the performance of the joint
stock company was even more clearly expressed in the parliamentary debates. A
proposed clause to limit the benefits of disclosure to the shareowners was with-
drawn after a discussion made it clear that the majority intended to also protect
"the interests of the public, the creditors, third persons, who came into contact
with the corporation". 53 This policy has been repeatedly reinforced by court deci-
sions. 54
Whenever the interests of the "nation" or the "public" are invoked, one has to
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be particularly careful. These terms are not only dangerous because of their emo-
tional impact - who could dare to oppose measures in the interest of the "public"?
- they also tend to cover up the exact intentions and aims of the speaker because
of their ambiguity. If one carefully analyzes the exact meaning of the "interests of
the public" and of the "economic life as a whole" in the discussion of the 1870's,
one discovers that the "public" consisted of all those persons who were involved in
business relations with the corporation, especially the creditors (who included the
workers, according to the prevailing philosophy of the time), the suppliers, and to
a lesser degree the customers. 5' By protecting these persons, or rather by enabling
them to protect themselves, the Act protected the institution of the joint stock
company 56 as a type of company which is indispensable for economic develop-
ment in its ability to attract and collect anonymous capital for large ventures in the
era of industrialization. The arguments were a typical product of classical liberalistic
thought, with its strict dichotomy of "public" and "private" areas of life. No
government or state interests were involved. Like all economic activity, the exis-
tence of joint stock companies and their performance was a matter left to the
forces of "society"; the rights and duties of the "state" were limited to providing
adequate protection for the honest citizen and the stock corporation as a whole
against "fraud".
During the discussions of the late 1920's and tile early 1930's preceding the
reform of disclosure requirements in the Joint Stock Company Act, the interests of
the "public" were again of major concern. The official draft for a revised Joint
Stock Company Act stated:
Tile common rule, well known to every civilized nation, that the administrator of other
peoples' assets is obliged to give an account, is as far as the big enterprises of today are con-
cerned applicable to their relation to the entirety of the citizens of this state. These enterprises
have agglomerated national property to such an enormous degree that the nation as a whole has
an urgent and legitimate interest to be informed about the performance of the administration as
far as this is not detrimental to the company. 57
Surprisingly parallel to Marxist thinking, the government draft states that the
constantly increasing concentration process and tile predominance of big corpora-
tions is caused by the "natural laws of economic development". 58 Contrary to
orthodox Marxist thinking, however, the draft accepts this development as
"rational" and, perhaps because it was influenced by literature advocating a system
of "economic democracy", 59 assumes that the accumulation of "national prop-
erty" will and eventually must lead towards a "communal economy" (Gemeinwirt-
schaft); i.e., an economic order not dominated by individual profit motivation but
by considerations which take the interests of the nation as a whole as their major
guideline. Within this ideology, it appeared to be obvious that big companies, as
such, are valuable and worthy of protection. The companies were accountable to
the people, but only as far as no company secrets were involved.
It is obvious that the "public" in the 1920's and 1930's was totally different
from that in the 1870's. The citizen as a part of the "body politic", in addition to
"private persons" who actually or potentially were in contact with the corporation,
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had become the center of attention. The rationale for disclosure had moved from
the realm of the self-regulating "society" into the area of the "state" which could
regulate however it saw fit politically. 60 This change of emphasis can be supported
by the observation that during this period the interest of the press in publications
of joint stock companies increased widely. 61
This general attitude prevailed during the Nazi era and during the early postwar
years. The commission on Enterprise Law, initiated by the most prominent German
lawyers association, the Deutsche Juristentag, submitted a report in 1955 which
basically was in accordance with the reasoning of the draft of the 1930's. The big
"enterprise as such" was of major importance and had to be protected; 62 since this
enterprise was a matter of national interest, ways and means had to be devised to
assure that the interest of the public was adequately taken into account. While the
shift of emphasis from the "private" to the "public" sector was evident, it still
remained rather vague as to what exactly the interests of "the public" consisted of,
and consequently which measures the state had to take in order to insure that those
interests were protected. Not surprisingly, the report proved fruitless as far as legis-
lation was concerned.
The discussion during the intervening decades up to the present has defined the
issues more clearly. Today there appears to be wide agreement that big corporations
and other big enterprises carry a special responsibility for the well-being of the
nation and the economy because of their political importance. These enterprises are
the "decisive centers of production and distribution"; they, to a large extent,
"determine the investment ratio of a country". 63 They can bargain with communi-
ties for tax cuts and subsidies; their decision to build or shut down a plant not only
affects the future of the workers but also the ability of cities and counties, possibly
even whole states, to fulfill their basic functions, to build roads, schools, kinder-
gartens, etc. 64 Because of this political dimension of management decisions, it
seems evident that all relevant information must be provided to allow rational
public discussion as the basis for potentially necessary political intervention.
There are two totally different main lines of thought which led to this common
result. The Freiburg school of ORDO-liberalism, 65 which exerted a tremendous
influence on economic and political thought in postwar West Germany, abandoned
the idea that the "big enterprise as such" was worthy of special protection. On the
contrary, the dangers caused by oligopolistic market structures were as well-recog-
nized as those of the political power of strong economic units. Concentration and
the predominance of large companies was not considered a development based on
"natural economic laws" anymore, but as a detrimental occurrence in the course
of economic history which would have to be controlled by state intervention. The
primary instrument for state intervention was to be an antitrust law through which
competition could be reestablished. Competition would then automatically mini-
mize the economic and political power of the big enterprises. Disclosure played an
important role for two major reasons: insufficient information about larger com-
panies could conceivably lead to public distrust and eventually to state intervention
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even where competition remained intact and such intervention - according to the
teachings of ORDO-liberalism - was consequently uncalled for and dangerous;
secondly, only publicity could help to avoid mismanagement. 66 The call for more
publicity was "not at all a socialistic, but an eminently conservative idea". 67 It
was a safeguard against state involvement.
The other group of advocates for extended disclosure, consisting mainly of the
labor unions, the Social Democrats 68 and certain schools of Catholic social
philosophy, employed arguments which in many relevant points were diametrically
opposed to those of the first group. Reforms in the Joint Stock Company Act or
the Stock Exchange Act were considered of minor importance, since both laws
focused mainly on the relationship between actual or potential shareholders and the
company but neglected other concerned parties, mainly the employees and the
"political" public. Furthermore, not even the relationship between the company
and the shareholders was adequately regulated as far as corporations with thousands
of stockholders were concerned. The split between ownership and control left
share-holders powerless and made management independent of them. Company law
reform was not called for, but what was needed was a new "constitution for enter-
prises" - regardless of the particular type of incorporation - which adequately
represented the interests of the "owners", the workers, the labor unions and the
political public. 69
The plea for more disclosure was just the first step in a new direction, one point
in a large scale of demands, the most important being the demand for workers'
co-determination on the supervisory board. Ever since the labor unions and the
Social Democrats abandoned their plans for the socialization of large parts of the
important industries, they have adopted this approach and demanded disclosure for
large companies regardless of company type. 70 They considered it "a self-evident
ingredient of progressive democracy". '1
The most important piece of legislation in the field of disclosure requirements in
recent years, the Law Governing Financial Statements and Reports of Certain
Enterprises and Affiliated Groups of 1969, 72 was a direct result of this discussion.
When the Social Democrats for the first time in postwar history entered govern-
ment in a coalition with Christian Democrats, they managed to extend disclosure to
all big companies without regard to their type of incorporation (at the price of sup-
porting another Act favored by the Christian Democrats, which contained tax cuts
for industry).
The government, when it introduced the bill, gave the following reasons, wthich
by now should sound familiar:
The fate of a large enterprise influences not only the private lives of its owners. It affects the
interests of a multitude of third persons and often even their existence. The situation of a large
enterprise is, e.g., essential for the investment decisions of many other enterprises which are its
suppliers or customers. The jobs of so many workers are dependent upon it that its develop-
ment, for better or for worse, is of essential importance for the regional, sometimes even for the
national labor market. The expansion and decline of such enterprises influences the structure
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and the financial situation of whole cities; not infrequently, they set data for the economic
policies of the government. The legitimate interest of all the concerned parties - defined as
current and future suppliers and customers, employees, creditors and all institutions which
might have to make political dicisions on social or economic issues which might affect the
enterprise - in having the opportunity to inform themselves about the situation and the per-
formance of the enterprise, has to be recognized. The interests of all these concerned parties
and therefore the public 73 in obtaining evidence upon which to base their judgment prevails
over the owners possible contrary interests. 74
The second reason given, which greatly increased the chances for the passage of
the bill, was that the most spectacular bankruptcies in the 1960's involved enter-
prises which were not subject to the requirement that they disclose their annual
financial reports. It was presumed that disclosure would have insured orderly
management and would have avoided those collapses. 75
It is interesting and significant for the mainstream of German political and legal
thinking in this respect to note that even the strong opponents of the bill hardly
dared to deny the interests of "all parties concerned" and the "public." During the
parliamentary debate, they criticized as arbitrary the criteria by which it was deter-
mined that an enterprise was large and thereby subject to disclosure. They claimed
that publicity could not possibly avoid bankruptcies, 76 that the legal harmoniza-
tion efforts within the E.E.C. might be hindered, 77 and they criticized a long list of
the bill's technical details.
The main thrust of the opposing view might be best summarized by a joint
memorandum of the leading organizations of industry. 78 In addition to the criti-
cism just mentioned, industry complained that the Act neglected the well-estab-
lished principle of German company law that all rules should be based on the par-
ticular type of incorporation, and that the criteria were dangerously reminiscent of
those that the labor unions had proposed for extended workers co-determinat-
tion. 79 But the main point of criticism was that the existing information require-
ments already served the same interests at least as well as the proposed bill would
and the new law could even be harmful. With respect to the economy as a whole,
quite a number of state agencies were well informed, especially the National Bank
(Bundesbank) and the tax authorities. The creditors and suppliers could always
insist on getting information about the affairs of the enterprise. Banks, in particular,
had the legal right to demand the balance sheet whenever a credit amounting to
more than 20,000 DM was involved. The National Bank had to be informed when-
ever a loan over 1,000,000 DM was granted. As far as workers were concerned, their
interests were well protected by the co-determination laws. Just as a last weak
point, it was argued that the Act might be unconstitutional 80 and that the
"public" might be too diffuse a term to be of any relevance. The main thrust of the
arguments plainly was that additional information was not needed.
As far as the interests of the employees are concerned, an argument certainly
could be made that they already are much better informed through the provisions
of labor law than their colleagues in any other nation, and much more efficiently
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than they would be through disclosure laws. According to § 111 of the Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz, a worker council on the plant level has quite a number of co-deter-
mination rights concerning hiring and firing and even the closing of a plant; these
are supplemented by information rights in economic affairs. On the management
level of all sizeable companies, workers representatives make up one-third of the
members of the supervisory board. In the steel and coal industry, they even have as
many seats on the supervisory boards as the capital owners. 81 With some varia-
tions, this model was extended to all companies with more than 2,000 employees
in 1976. 82
One might be tempted to agree with the proposition put forth by the industrial
organizations. How could a balance sheet and a report that describes the activites of
the past ever be superior to the current information rights enjoyed by the workers
representatives in the workers council and on the supervisoy board? Nevertheless,
parliament was not convinced that disclosure was superfluous. And rightly so. For
industry neglected to take into account that on the one hand, the workers repre-
sentatives are widely bound to secrecy, and secondly, that most of the information
rights did not apply to privately-owned enterprises.
The other new laws extending disclosure requirements, the Foreign Investment
Act of 1969 and the Investment Act as amended in 1970, followed the traditional
policy considerations to prevent fraud. Both Acts proved to be successful within
their limited areas of application; they practically eliminated all dishonest or ques-
tionable investment companies - possibly even a few others 83 - but they did not
prevent fraudulent offers in the capital market as a whole. Shady investment
advisors speedily moved on to offering shares of tax shelter companies, which for
tax reasons were organized as limited partnerships (KG). 84
The traditional German approach would have been to concentrate on the elimi-
nation of fraud and dishonesty, either by regulating the offerors or by elimination
of the tax incentives to invest in areas which, according to the average investor's
judgment, were considered not profitable enough and/or too risky. Surprisingly,
the debate took a different turn. 85 For once, it was recognized that attempts
to stop newly-discovered gaps in the system of investor protection would prob-
ably prove futile; inventive investment advisors and promoters would most
likely find new loopholes as long as legislation only attempted to check fraud step
by step, whenever it became evident. Following the U.S., Belgian, and French
examples, it seemed advisable to regulate not only offers of investment company
shares, but all public offers of investment opportunities.
But even more importantly, fraud and dishonesty were not the only subjects of
attention. For the first time in German legal history, a wider community of
lawyers 86 discussed the fact that certain mechanisms, which clearly could suppress
fraudulent investment activities, might have detrimental effects in other respects;
for instance, investments favored by public policy might be hindered by those mea-
sures. The already extremely narrow market for venture capital in Germany might
be totally shut down, even though that kind of capital is urgently needed by young,
ambitious and inventive businessmen, whose plans do not seem safe enough to
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obtain loans according to the traditional standards of a paternalistic banking com-
munity. The economy as a whole might suffer if all capital were channeled into
established lines of business. It seemed that the discussion that is well-known in the
U.S. about capital market efficiency had finally begun in Germany. It was generally
agreed that the desired goal could best be attained by producing transparency (i.e.,
maximizing the information available) in the capital market, and that this trans-
parency could best be obtained by the introduction of strict disclosure require-
ments for every first public offering of an investment opportunity. Interestingly
enough, however, all offers made by banks were to be excluded from regulation. As
to those offers, transparency and capital market efficiency apparently were irrele-
vant for the majority of participants and the discussion again centered around
"fraud".
The Federal Government is now preparing a draft Act Concerning Public Offer-
ings of Investment Opportunities along these lines, which should be passed by the
legislature within the next year.
4. Some speculations on the reasons for the differences in approach
Looking back on the evolution of German disclosure regulation, it is obvious
that economic efficiency was definitely not the cornerstone of the debate. Super-
ficially, this could be attributed to the fact that the German legal system has not
developed a separate field of the law called securities regulation or capital market
regulation. There has been no legal frame of reference from which disclosure
regulation could have been analyzed as a coherent policy objective geared to market
efficiency. Disclosure rules do exist, but they are tied to different policy traditions
and to different legal contexts: 87 Commercial Register publicity is an integral part
of commercial law within the field of civil law and disclosure by prospectus as
related to stock exchange activity has been viewed as part of governmental regula-
tion of the economy within the public law sector. 88 Disregarding the latest and
most recent turn of the discussion, investor protection, as a main element of the
efficiency argument, has not been an important policy issue. Some observers, 89
however, influenced and encouraged by U.S. experiences, predict imminent sub-
stantial change, using as evidence the new regulation of investment company activ-
ity and the reasons put forward to support governmental plans for a statute on
public offerings.
To evaluate this optimism, one has to ask why the development in both coun-
tries has been so markedly different, and if the forces underlying these differences
have actually lost their momentum. It is our view that some skepticism may be in
order.
Comparative law as a legal science has lost its innocence of method. It is widely
accepted today that it is not necessarily useful to isolate a legal body of rules and to
look for equivalents of those rules in other countries. Rather, the social problems of
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a country and the particular interests a specific law has been created to serve must
be considered; it is then necessary to decide whether or not these same problems
and interests have existed beyond one's own national boundaries, and if so, how
they were approached in other countries. 90 Also, where legal developments are to
be compared, it is important to remember that policy objectives, which eventually
became law, are shaped within the context of specific political and economic
developments varying from country to country. Thus, in a recent seminar in Frank-
furt of the International Faculty to Consider Regulatory Problems arising from
Internationalization of Securities Business, 91 it was asked why the securities
markets in Germany are much narrower than in the U.S. and Great Britain, why the
number of German companies listed on German stock exchanges, which was small
from the beginning, is shrinking, and why the German public is so much more
reluctant to invest money in shares than the public in other countries. All these
questions are pertinent to our subject of investor-oriented disclosure legislation
because it may be that capital market problems are not politically and socially rele-
vant enough in Germany to rally the public support necessary for structural change.
To put the question this way places it outside of the economist's field and within
that of the political scientist.
Several attempts have been made to explain the narrowness of the German
capital market, 92 meaning, of course, that compared to the U.S. relatively few
persons are seriously concerned about that area. 93 An obvious primary reason for
this difference is that in Germany the functions of capital accumulation for
personal needs and old age have been for all practical purposes taken over for most
people by a very extensive system of social security and obligatory public insurance.
This directs huge amounts of money to self-administered public funds which would
otherwise have gone into private savings, private insurance, and the securities
market. For a resident of the U.S., it may be difficult to realize that about 32% of
the German GNPis absorbed by the social security system. Originally, social security
legislation was confined to laborers. It was later extended to white-collar workers,
and it now includes the self-employed up to a certain limit of income. The claims
against these public funds are considered by most as a comparatively reliable invest-
ment since the system has actually managed to survive the national catastrophes of
German history which most other forms of investment did not.
Another German particularity to be added in this context is that it is a common
practice of business enterprises to finance pension obligations owed their own
workers and employees with funds that are not segregated from the enterprise's
working capital. Of course, there are a great number of instances where these funds
are administered by firm-based independent legal entities. However, liquidity is
taken away from the securities market.
It has often been remarked that the German mentality is averse to risks. This is
said to have a strong impact on the structure of the German capital market. British
and U.S. observers also tend to attribute the narrowness of the German securities
market to the average investor's underdeveloped state of mind towards more
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refined forms of saving. It is questionable, though, that this is an adequate assess-
ment. The overall level of household saving in Germany has been, and still is, com-
paratively high. 94 It is certainly true that the average German saver nourishes a
general distrust of the securities market. After all, a great number of well-to-do
Germans twice in one generation lost fortunes that had been invested in industrial
securities. The uneasiness is even greater towards forms of savings with continu-
ously wide oscillations in value. Thus, savings invested in the bond market have
been far greater than those invested in the stock market. Even more significant for
the analysis of the conduct of the average saver is the fact that, for a very long time
now, the increase in saving deposits has surpassed the combined sale of stocks and
bonds. 95
It is doubtful whether the comparatively narrow German securities market can
be explained solely by investor psychology or the German public's lack of financial
sophistication. If these were the true explanations, it would probably be only a
question of time until the Germans reach the advanced international standard. The
finding that, on the average, the working capital of German companies is self-
financed to the extent of less than 30% and is supplied by debt to the extent of
more than 70% 96 could be taken as a true expression of the unimpaired aggregate
preference of an efficient capital market. However, such an assessment would be
oversimplistic because it leaves out the strong influence of tax law, and it is even
more seriously misleading because it does not take into account historically rooted
structural differences in the organization of markets and the differences in eco-
nomic and political leverage of various social groups and institutions within a
society. Since these structural aspects of a society are closely related to both the
structure of the capital market and to the distribution of power within a national
economy, an adequate comparative analysis requires the joint efforts of lawyers,
economists, and political scientists. The following remarks can do no more than
offer some sketchy speculation about the underlying forces that have shaped the
German thinking on capital market matters.
The need for capital in a developed and dynamic industry, and the relative lack
of direct involvement of the average German investor in the securities market, cor-
responds with the presence of an overexpanded intermediate business sector. The
German capital market is strongly dominated by institutional investors, namely, the
German all-purpose banks and other investment institutions which are, to a great
extent, managed by the banks. 97 Private insurance companies and pension funds
play a minor role in the stock market, but they do have an important stake in the
bond market. As a consequence of a liberal political attitude towards foreign
capital, there is a strong influence from that source; 98 but it does not amount to
anything like restoring the laws of individualistic market competition along the
lines of classical economic thinking. Since a functioning non-oligopolistic market is
important for the practical relevance of a debate about disclosure in terms of effi-
ciency gains or losses, it becomes apparent why this type of discussion has not
taken place in Germany, and why, at the bottom of the German discussion, politi-
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cal arguments concerning outside control by non-industrial, non-banking interests
played a more decisive role than market economics.
It would be premature to assert that this in itself is a bad thing. 99 On the one
side, it has been argued with some strength that the traditional dominance of the
banks and their comparatively narrow ties with their industrial debtors has served
the German economy well and perhaps even better than more developed capital
markets in other countries have served their economies. On the other hand, there is
evidence of a serious conflict between the interests the all-purpose bank serves in its
roles as holder of equities, creditor, trustee of depository voting rights of a multi-
tude of shareholders, selector of members on a company's supervisory council
and intermediary to the capital market. Furthermore, the banks are in a position to
offer their clients a wide selection of attractive investment opportunities, including
shares, bonds, saving accounts, investment certificates and gold. The customer's
choice is often not a matter of indifference to the bank because of the many other
interests it has to protect. We do not want to take a definite stand on the question
of whether performance, power and control of the German banks are adequately
balanced. The point we want to make is that a discussion of the possibility of
change in the capital market structure remains futile without an in-depth analysis of
the interests of the banks, and without an assessment of the strength of possible
countervailing powers.
The same is true of an evaluation of the relevance of the disclosure debate. In
Germany, only the government, striving for a coherent and effective economic
policy, and to a lesser extent, the trade unions are likely to formulate and pursue
interests contrary to those of the banks. In other countries with different industrial
and banking traditions, and with different political traditions and ideals, the rele-
vant economic and political interests bearing on the structure of the capital market
have been more widely dispersed within various social groups: industry, brokers,
banks, institutional investors, and the community of private investors do have
divergent interests. In Germany, the polarization of interests that has taken place
explains why the disclosure debate was centered around the diffuse interest of the
public rather than the efficiency of the capital market.
The argument would be inconclusive if it could not be shown that the banks
have no interest in widening existing disclosure requirements for their industrial
clients and for themselves. The banks do have other means of acquiring needed
information 100 as creditors, members of supervisory boards, shareholders, and
trustees of depository voting rights. It is certainly difficult to assess the extent of
cooperation between banks with respect to relevant business information, even
though it is not to be denied that they compete strongly in most sectors of bank
services.
The words of Alfred Marshall in his wide-ranging survey, Industry and Trade
published in 1919, have lost nothing of their truth. Referring to the situation in
Germany, he wrote, 101 "Each of the great banks has representatives in several
other banks and in a vast number of industrial enterprises .... Representatives of
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol1/iss1/5
H. Kohl, R. T1alz / The German way towards disclosure
banks have exercised, for two generations at least, a strong control on industrial
business which they support". C.H. Wilson 102 describes German banks in the later
nineteenth century as being not merely credit organizations but political-economic
agencies for converting Germany into an industrial state. And the astute British
observer of the German economy Andrew S. Shonfield 103 adds:
The big banks have always seen it as their business to take an overall view of the long term
trend in any industry in which they were concerned, and then to press individual firms to con-
form to certain broad lines of development. They saw themselves essentially as the grand strate-
gists of the nation's industry .... It would be wrong, however, to cast the German banks in the
role of the ringmaster, with the big horses of industry galloping round them and responding to
the crack of the whip. The lines of influence between the large bank and the large industrial
enterprise are reciprocal. What tends to emerge out of this process is a consensus of big business
about the affairs of an industry.
It is quite clear that this alliance throughout German industrial history has never
been sympathetic to the dissemination of business information to outside groups
and has used its varying but always considerable political influence to this end.
But what about the headway the disclosure philosophy has made recently in the
regulation of investment companies? What about the general interest within the law
community evidenced at the last session of the Deutsche Juristentag in 1976
towards the idea of a prospectus obligation for all public offerings? Are these not
encouraging signs that investor protection, capital market efficiency, and disclosure
obligations are gaining momentum in Germany?
Perhaps. It may be argued that the long-run decrease in profits from invested
capital, the increasingly unsound size of bank debts in relation to other forms of
financing, and the present unwillingness of the public to engage in long-term invest-
ment will lead industry to increase its efforts to gain the confidence of the individ-
ual investor. But, on the other hand, it is certainly no coincidence that the regula-
tion imposed on foreign investment companies was a reaction to the tremendous
original success and later shattering failure of IOS operations which as a whole had
bypassed the German banks. The debate on the law concerning public offerings has
emerged from large scale misuse of tax shelter quasi-companies, 104 a branch of
business which not only has sidestepped the banks but has competed with them
most effectively in attracting huge amounts of money.
It is true that the efficiency argument, ably presented by Hopt and Mertens at
the Deutsche Juristentag, was well-received at that assembly when it considered the
pros and cons of a prospectus obligation for all public offerings. But there was also
almost general agreement that investment securities offered for sale by German
credit institutions and banks should be exempted. This may be justified on the
ground that the German banks' vast expertise in the matter is an even better protec-
tion for the individual investor than a prospectus. The proposed exemption would
certainly reflect the continuing viability of the German way to disclosure which is to
take measures against fraud and deceit at the fringes of the market, backing this up
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1978
H. Kohl, R. WValz / The Gennan way towards disclosure
with efficiency arguments, and to rely on the banks' good judgment as to what is
good for the main body of the market. Thus, the oligopolistic structure of the
"market" for financial information is accepted as a way of life which has up until
now yielded satisfactory results. This, of course, is contrary to the U.S. disclosure
philosophy and the theory underlying it. Beyond verbal bridges, the gap between
the U.S. and the German approach remains wide.
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